Optimization of electrical grid protection by a differential evolution algorithm by Zio, Enrico et al.
Optimization of electrical grid protection by a
differential evolution algorithm
Enrico Zio, L. R. Golea, Giovanni Sansavini
To cite this version:
Enrico Zio, L. R. Golea, Giovanni Sansavini. Optimization of electrical grid protection by a
differential evolution algorithm. ESREL 2011, Sep 2011, Troyes, France. pp.2515-2521, 2011.
<hal-00658095>
HAL Id: hal-00658095
https://hal-supelec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00658095
Submitted on 12 Jan 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 INTRODUCTION 
We consider network protection (NP) by line switch-
ing by the system operator, following an attack or a 
failure to given components. Line switching is 
common practice for handling line overloads 
(Granelli et al. 2006), avoiding loss and/or cost re-
ductions (Schnyder & Glavitsch 1990), improving 
system security (Schnyder & Glavitsch 1988), and 
the combination of these (Shao & Vittal 2005). NP 
aims at hindering failure propagation by cutting off 
the possible “directions” along which failures can 
spread within the network. The strategy for such pro-
tection stands on the possibility of finding the opti-
mal set of lines to be switched-off in order to limit 
the consequences of cascade failures; in large net-
works, this poses a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem.  
In this paper, we address the NP optimization prob-
lem by a modified version of the binary differential 
evolution (MBDE) algorithm (Wang et al. 2010). 
Differential Evolution (DE) is an emerging popula-
tion-based stochastic optimization technique (Storn 
& Price 1995). The standard DE algorithm is simple 
and efficient and has been successfully applied in 
various scientific and engineering fields (Greem & 
Kim 2001, Mahdavi et al. 2007, Coelho & Bernert 
2008, Saka 2009), often with superior performance 
than alternative optimization algorithms, e.g. particle 
swarm optimization and GAs (Ponsich & Coello 
2009). MBDE is a novel binary version of DE de-
veloped to tackle binary-coded optimization prob-
lems (Wang et al. 2010).  
The goodness of the line switching solutions pro-
posed during the MBDE search is evaluated by a 
model of cascading failure process which relies on a 
topological representation of the network connection 
pattern (Zio & Sansavini 2009). This modeling en-
tails considering the interplay between structural 
characteristics and dynamical aspects and provides 
indications on the elements critical for the propaga-
tion process (Zio & Sansavini 2010), and on the ac-
tions that prevent or mitigate undesired effects 
(Motter 2004). Moreover, these models have shed 
light on the way complex networks react to faults 
and attacks, evaluating their consequences when 
propagation dynamics are taken into account. The 
system response often results in a dramatic cascade 
phenomenon due to avalanches of node outages. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the basis of the model of cascading fail-
ures. The description of the MBDE algorithm is pro-
vided in Section 3. Section 4 presents the suggested 
NP strategy. The results of the NP optimization 
framework applied to a realistic case study, i.e. the 
Italian 380kV power transmission grid, are summa-
rized in Section 5. Section 6 provides conclusions 
and points out directions for future work. 
2 THE MODEL OF CASCADING FAILURES IN 
NETWORK SYSTEMS 
We adopt a topological representation of the power 
grid as a network of N nodes (substations or buses) 
and K edges (transmission lines). Two types of buses 
are distinguished here: NG generators, i.e. sources for 
power, and ND distribution nodes (loads or primary 
substations), i.e. at the outer edge of the transmission 
grid. In order to abstractly account for the flow of the 
physical quantities in the network, we assume that 
the power is transmitted along the generator-
distributor shortest paths (Batagelj 1994, Motter & 
Lai 2002, Albert et al. 2004, Newman & Girvan 
2004, Latora & Marchiori 2005, Duenas-Osorio & 
Vemuru 2009, Zio & Sansavini 2010).  
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We model the load on a component, e.g. a bus or 
transmission line, as dependent on the number of 
shortest paths transiting through it, when flow is sent 
from each available generation node to each distribu-
tion node. In this view, the load, Lj, or amount of 
flow passing through a node, is measured by the 
node betweenness (Sabidussi 1966, Nieminen 1974, 
Freeman 1978, Freeman et al. 1991, Little 2002), 
calculated as the number of generator-distributor 
shortest paths that pass through that node. Assuming 
that power is routed through the most direct path, the 
betweenness of a bus gives an approximation of the 
amount of power flowing through it (Albert et al. 
2004). Likewise, the load, Lij, or amount of flow 
passing through an edge, is measured by the edge 
betweenness (Girvan & Newman 2002). Node/edge 
betweenness measures the influence of a node/edge 
with respect to the flow of information in the net-
work, especially in cases where the flow of infor-
mation follows the available generator-distributor 
shortest path (Albert et al. 2004). 
In order to assess the status of a component, its load 
is compared with the component capacity, i.e. the 
maximum load that it can process. The capacity is 
limited by technological constraints and economic 
factors. The capacity of node j is dimensioned pro-
portionally to its nominal load Lj at which it is de-
signed to operate, Cj = (1+ α)Lj. Likewise, the capac-
ity of link ij is dimensioned proportionally to its 
nominal load Lij at which it is designed to operate, 
Cij = (1+ α)Lij, where α > 0 is the tolerance parame-
ter of the power transmission network. This parame-
ter can be regarded as an operating margin allowing 
safe operations of the component under possible 
load increments. When α = 0, the system is working 
at its limit capacity, its operating margin being null: 
any further load added to a component would result 
in its failure and, possibly, in the propagation of a 
cascading failure involving a large part of the sys-
tem. 
When a component fails, it ceases to provide its ser-
vice and is removed from the system. This leads to a 
redistribution of the shortest paths in the network 
and, consequently, to a change in the loads of the 
components remained active. If upon redistribution 
of the shortest paths, the load on a component in-
creases beyond its capacity, the component fails and 
a new redistribution follows. The cascade process of 
successive failures is a function of the nodes states 
and also of the edge states, extending a common ref-
erence model (Batagelj 1994, Motter & Lai 2002, 
Albert et al. 2004, Newman & Girvan 2004, Latora 
& Marchiori 2005, Duenas-Osorio & Vemuru 2009, 
Zio & Sansavini 2010). 
In this work, the effects of cascading failures are 
summarized by two indicators, the connectivity loss, 
CL, and the cascade size, S. The former quantifies 
the decrease of the ability of distribution substations 
to receive power from generators; its calculation re-
lies on the topological structure of the network and 
the available “least-resistance” pathways: 
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where NG and ND represent the numbers of generator 
and distribution nodes in the unperturbed state of the 
network, and iGN  represents the number of genera-
tion units able to supply flow to distribution node i 
after failures take place.  
While the failure of lines only contributes to the fur-
ther propagation of the cascade through load redirec-
tion, the failure of buses implies also the inability to 
provide electrical load to areas of the network. For 
this reason, we select to measure the disruption 
caused by the failure cascade by the number of nodes 
made inactive by the cascade, through S, and by the 
inability of generator nodes to power distributor 
nodes, through CL. 
3 MODIFIED BINARY DIFFERENTIAL 
EVOLUTION ALGORITHM 
An improved binary DE (Wang et al. 2010) is used 
for optimizing the NP strategy.  
DE has been originally developed as a population-
based global optimization algorithm for real-valued 
optimization problems (Storn and Price 1995). The 
original idea of DE lies in the way of perturbing the 
current population: this is obtained by adding to a 
chromosome the weighted difference between two 
others randomly selected from the population. The 
initial population is randomly generated by sampling 
values uniformly distributed between the lower and 
upper bounds of each of the decision variables. 
Three evolutionary operations, i.e., mutation, cross-
over and selection are used to update the population.  
During the first operation, the mutated individual vi, 
called noisy vector, is generated according to the fol-
lowing equation 
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where F, a positive real constant, is the scaling fac-
tor, t  is the index of generation and 
1 2 3
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are three randomly chosen individuals, i.e. target 
vectors, with indexes r1≠r2≠r3≠i. 
After mutation, the noisy vector is further modified 
by the crossover process, in which the noisy and tar-
get vectors are mixed according to some rule to cre-
ate the trial vector ui. The trial vector inherits from 
the noisy and the target vectors different pieces of 
chromosome, as regulated by the crossover rate CR. 
The commonly used binomial crossover is defined 
as: 
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where U(0,1] is a uniform continuous random value 
ϵ[0,1], irand(P) is a uniform discrete random num-
ber in the set ϵ{1, 2, …, P}, P is the population size, 
j is the index of the dimensionality and K is the 
length of the chromosome. 
The selection operator is defined as: 
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Referring to a single objective (SO) minimization, if 
the fitness value of the trial individual is better than 
the target one, it replaces the target individual; oth-
erwise, the target individual is preserved in the next 
generation. This criterion ensures that the next gen-
eration is better than or at least equal to the previous 
one.  
In the NP optimization problem here of interest, the 
decision variable vector x is composed of K elements 
corresponding to the network links; each element 
contains 1 if the corresponding line is to be 
switched-off, 0 otherwise. The objective function of 
the optimization is CL(x). 
 
We define the attack/failure scenario whose conse-
quences have to be minimized via an optimal NP 
strategy. We consider the attack to/failure of a single 
component whose following cascading process max-
imizes the damage to the network.  
4 NETWORK PROTECTION STRATEGY 
In practice, we identify the component whose re-
moval yields the largest disruption in the network.  
NP aims at minimizing the effects of the cascade 
failure propagation by switching off lines after the 
cascade is triggered. Within the modeling framework 
here adopted, the cascade unfolds rapidly, through 
the shortest paths.  
The NP strategy consists in taking action only once 
after the cascade is triggered, by opening several 
lines to prevent failure propagation. The issue is to 
decide which set of lines to disconnect in order to 
protect most from the cascade propagation.  
The protection optimization seeks interventions that 
minimize the objective function CL(x), i.e. the con-
nectivity loss of the network configuration x = {xj | xj 
ϵ {0,1}, j = 1,…,K}, where xj = 1 if link j is operat-
ing, or 0 otherwise. 
Initially, all components, N nodes and K links, are 
characterized by initial loads Li and Lij, respectively, 
and maximum capacities, Ci and Cij, respectively. 
The optimization is carried out by the MBDE algo-
rithm, that uses binary variables to characterize the 
line switching decisions, as detailed in Section 3. 
The algorithm for simulating the combined effects of 
the cascading failures and protection strategy pro-
ceeds in successive propagation steps as follows. 
0. The initiating event occurs, i.e. the failure of 
the most critical component, which is removed from 
the network. Each component that is operating is 
tested for failure: for i = 1,…, N, if node i is working 
and Li > Ci then node i fails; if link ij is working and 
Lij > Cij then link ij fails. 
1. The operator intervenes by switching off a set 
of lines, in order to limit the cascade failure effects, 
expressed by the objective function. The MBDE op-
timization algorithm returns the most appropriate 
network configuration that minimizes the objective 
function at the end of the current step t = 1.  
2. The components loads are re-distributed tak-
ing into account the new, protected network topolo-
gy. Each component that is operating is tested for 
failure: for i = 1,..., N, if node i is working and Li > 
Ci then node i fails; if link ij is working and Lij > Cij 
then link ij fails. 
3. The stage counter t is incremented by 1 and the 
algorithm is returned to step 2. 
4. The algorithm stops when no more working 
nodes fail. 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The NP optimization framework of Sections 3 and 4 
has been applied to the topological network of the 
380 kV Italian power transmission network (Figure 
1). The 380 kV Italian power transmission network 
is a branch of a high voltage level transmission, 
which can be modeled as a network of N = 127 
nodes (NG = 30 generators and ND = 97 distributors) 
and K = 171 edges. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the load distribution on each 
component when the network operates at nominal 
conditions. Node 88 and link 104 (the line connect-
ing nodes 75 and 88) handle the largest load in the 
system, i.e. the largest number of generator-
distribution shortest paths under our modeling 
scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The 380 kV Italian power transmission network 
(TERNA 2002, Rosato et al. 2007) 
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Figure 2. Loads on each node in the unperturbed configuration 
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Figure 3. Loads on each line in the unperturbed configuration 
 
The initiating event is identified as described in Sec-
tion 4. Contrary to what can be supposed, it is found 
that the largest damages to the network are due to 
removals of components that are not among the most 
loaded (Figures 4-7). The removals of nodes 86 and 
78 have the largest impacts on the network with re-
spect to both CL and S. The failure of the most load-
ed node, i.e. node 88, leads to cascades involving 28 
components, compared to 48 components that fail 
when node 86 triggers the cascade. Also, CL = 0.77 
when the system stabilizes if node 88 is removed, 
but CL = 0.94 when node 78 fails. The criticality of 
nodes 86 and 78 with respect to cascading failures is 
due to their position in the network, in proximity of 
highly loaded nodes. 
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Figure 4. The cascade size, S, caused by the removal of each 
node (abscissa) in the power transmission system of Figure 1 
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Figure 5. The connectivity loss, CL , caused by the removal of 
each node (abscissa) in the power transmission system of Fig-
ure 1 
 
The effects of cascading failures are investigated al-
so with respect to the loss of lines. The removal of 
link 107 connecting nodes 78 and 81, results in the 
largest damage in terms of S (57 nodes fail at the end 
of the cascade failure propagation) and CL = 0.96, 
while the failure of the most loaded link, i.e. 104, 
leads to S = 27 components and CL = 0.71. The aver-
age initial load has little influence on the criticality, 
whereas the neighbors load and the failure of the 
connection between node 78 and 81, have a large 
impact (node 78 is found to be a critical node in trig-
gering the cascading failure propagation). 
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Figure 6. The cascade size, S, caused by the removal of each 
link (abscissa) in the power transmission system of Figure 1 
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Figure 7. The connectivity loss, CL, caused by the removal of 
each link (abscissa) in the power transmission system of Figure 
1 
 
We observe that, on average, the loss of links results 
in a more severe damage than that caused by the loss 
of nodes, both in terms of CL and S. This is due to 
the fact that failure of a link causes the redistribution 
of the components loads to other working compo-
nents (nodes and links). The disconnection of the 
transmission line (edge) 107 is identified as the 
worst-case scenario. 
5.1 Protection 
The cascade propagation is triggered at t = 0 by an 
attack/failure consisting in the disruption of link 107, 
and produces the loss of six nodes by the end of the 
first propagation step, t = 1. We aim at reducing the 
effects of the continuation of the cascade of failures 
in the network through the application of the protec-
tion strategy. The optimization parameters are sum-
marized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. The parameters of the MBDE algorithm 
MBDE parameters 
Population size P 40 
Dimensionality of solutions K 171 
Crossover rate CR 0.8 
Scaling factor F 0.2 
Minimum fitness error 10
-4 
Maximum number of generation 1500 
The optimal NP strategy requires disabling 27 lines, 
i.e. 21% of the network connections (Table 2, col-
umn 2). This represents a feasible number of lines to 
be switched-off and it is consistent with the size of 
other protection strategies reported in the literature. 
As an example, (Salmeron et al. 2004) suggests a 
protection strategy that involves the hardening of 
50% of lines in a network characterized by 24 nodes 
and 40 lines.  
The optimal set of lines identified in the protection 
strategy is represented in Figure 8. The lines are 
spread over the entire network with a major concen-
tration in the northern part. By adopting this protec-
tion strategy, the operator intervention maintains a 
good level of working components with acceptable 
CL. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The dotted lines in this graphic representation of the 
network are the optimal set of 27 edges to be switched-off to 
optimally contain the failure cascade 
 
Figure 9 presents the effects of the cascade after the 
initial failure, without any operator intervention (dot-
ted line) and with the operator intervention of 
switching off the optimal set of 27 lines, both in 
terms of S (left graph) and CL (right graph).  
The effects of the NP intervention can be evinced by 
comparing the evolutions in Figure 9. The optimal 
line switching intervention at t = 1 reduces S and CL 
by 87.7% and by 34.6%, respectively. The failures 
keep propagating in the network and the cascade 
ends at t = 3. The results obtained when the system 
is stabilized are satisfactory: S is reduced from 57 
nodes to 10 nodes, while CL is improved by approx-
imately 21%. There are four nodes that fail after the 
operator intervenes with the protection strategy, i.e. 
Pieve A substation, situated in the Lombardy region 
and Rondissone, Trino and Turbigo substations, sit-
uated in the Piemonte region (Figure 1). 
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Figure 9. The cascade evolution in terms of cascade size, S, and 
connectivity loss, CL, after the failure of line 107 and with no 
intervention at t = 1 (solid lines) or optimal operator interven-
tion at t = 1 (dotted lines) 
 
The results obtained at the end of the optimization 
are summarized in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2.  Best optimal switching scheme 
Number 
of lines 
Optimal line switching 
scheme 
Connectivity loss, CL  
computational 
time t = 1  
end of 
cascade 
 
27 
2-8, 5-6, 14-73, 15-17, 
17-18, 24-28, 25-27, 
28-30, 32-35, 34-38, 
41-64, 41-66, 43-46, 
48-53, 51-54, 55-56, 
79-81, 89-91, 91-92, 
92-93, 96-98, 97-103, 
103-104, 110-111, 113-
120, 115-118, 121-123 
 
0.608 
 
0.758 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
We have considered the optimal protection of power 
networks by extending a previously developed mod-
el for cascading failures propagation and embedding 
it in a MBDE scheme of optimization. The worst-
case initiating failure scenario is determined by look-
ing at the effects of the cascading failures triggered 
by the removal of single nodes or links. The optimal 
protection strategy of line switching is identified by 
MBDE so as to limit the cascade failure conse-
quences.  
Future research steps will extend the abstract model 
of cascading failures beyond network abstraction to 
incorporate physical properties and time dynamics of 
power transmission. Within this framework, other 
interdiction scenarios and multiple protection strate-
gies can be developed. In particular, an iterative NP 
strategy can be implemented, that incorporates real-
time constraints arising from the network and load 
configuration updates given previous protective ac-
tions.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work was funded by the Foundation pour une 
Culture de Securite Industrielle of Toulouse, France, 
under the research contract AO2006–01. 
REFERENCES 
Albert, R., Albert, I. & Nakarado, G.L. 2004. Structural vulner-
ability of the North American power grid, Physical Review 
E 69, 025103(R). 
Batagelj, V. 1994. Semirings for social networks analysis, 
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 19(1): 53-68. 
Babu, B.V., Gujarathi, A.M., Katla, P. & Laxmi, V.B. 2007. 
Strategies of Multi-Objective Differential Evolution 
(MODE) for Optimization of Adiabatic Styrene Reactor. In 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Emerging 
Mechanical Technology: Macro to Nano (EMTMN-2007); 
p 243. 
Coelho, L.S. & Bernert, D.L.A. 2008 An improved harmony 
search algorithm for synchronization of discrete-time chaot-
ic systems, Chaos Solitons Fract. 
Dueñas-Osorio, L. & Vemuru, S.M., Cascading failures in 
complex infrastructures systems. Structural safety 31: 157-
167. 
Freeman, L.C., Centrality in social networks conceptual clarifi-
cation. Social Networks 1(3): 215-239. 
Freeman, L.C., Borgatti, S.P. & White, D.R., Centrality in val-
ued graphs: A measure of betweenness based on network 
flow, Social Networks 13(2): 141-154,1991. 
Girvan, M. & Newman, M.E.J., Community structure in social 
and biological networks, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., USA 99, 
5890, 2002. 
Granelli, G., Montagna, M., Zanellini, F., Bresesti, P., Vailati, 
R., & Innorta, M., Optimal network reconfiguration for 
congestion management by deterministic and genetic algo-
rithms, Elect. Power Syst. Res., vol. 76, pp. 549–556, Apr. 
2006. 
Geem, Z.W., Kim, J.H. & Loganathan, G.V., A new heuristic 
optimization algorithm: harmony search, Simulation 2001; 
76(2):60–8. 
Latora, V. & Marchoiri, M., Vulnerability and protection of in-
frastructure networks. Physical Review E 71, 015103. 
Little, R.G., Controlling Cascading Failure: Understanding the 
Vulnerabilities of Interconnected Infrastructures. Journal of 
Urban Technology 9(1): 109 – 123, 2002. 
Mahdavi, M., Fesanghary, M. & Damangir, E., An improved 
harmony search algorithm for solving optimization prob-
lems, Appl Math Comput 2007; 188(2):1567–79. 
Motter, A.E. & Lai, Y.-C., Cascade-based attacks on complex 
networks. Physical Review E 66(6): 065102, 2002. 
Motter, A.E., Cascade control and defense in complex Net-
works, Physical Review Letters, vol. 93, nr 9, pp. 
098701(1-4), 2004. 
Newman, M.E.J. & Girvan, M., Finding and evaluating com-
munity structure in networks. Physical Review E 69(2): 
026113, 2004. 
Nieminen, J., On the centrality in a graph. Scandinavian Journal 
of Psychology 15(1): 332-336, 1974. 
Ponsich, A. & Coello, C.A., Differential Evolution perfor-
mances for the solution of mixed integer constrained Pro-
cess Engineering problems, Applied Soft Computing 
(2009), doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2009.11.030. 
Sabidussi, G., The centrality index of graphs, Psychometrika, 
31(4), pp. 581-603, 1966. 
Saka, M.P., Optimum design of steel sway frames to BS5950 
using harmony search algorithm, J Constr Steel Res 2009; 
65(1):36–43. 
Salmeron, J., Wood, K. & Baldick, R., Analysis of Electric 
Grid Security Under Terrorist Threat, IEEE Transactions on 
power systems, Vol. 19, no. 2, May 2004.   
Schnyder, G. & Glavitsch, H., Integrated security control using 
an optimal power flow and switching concepts, IEEE Trans. 
Power Syst., vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 782–790, May 1988. 
Schnyder, G. & Glavitsch, H., Security enhancement using an 
optimal switching power flow, IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 
vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 674–681, May 1990. 
Shao, W. & Vittal, V., Corrective switching algorithm for re-
lieving overloads and voltage violations, IEEE Trans. Pow-
er Syst., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1877–1885, Nov. 2005. 
Storn, R. & Price, K., Differential evolution – A simple and ef-
ficient adaptive scheme for global optimization over contin-
uous spaces, Technical Report TR-95-012, International 
Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA. 1995.  
Talukdar, S.N., Apt, J., Ilic, M., Lave, L.B. & Morgan, M.G:, 
Cascading Failures: Survival versus Prevention, The Elec-
tricity Journal, Vol. 16, Issue 9, November 2003, pp. 25-31. 
Wang, L., Fu, X., Menhas, M.I. & Fei, M., A Modified Binary 
Differential Evolution Algorithm, Life System Modeling 
and Intelligent Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, 2010, Volume 6329/2010, 49-57, DOI: 10.1007/978-
3-642-15597-0_6. 
Zio, E. & Sansavini, G., Modeling failure cascade in network 
systems due to distributed random disturbances. Proceed-
ings ESREL 2008. Martorell et al. (eds): Safety, Reliability 
and Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications. 
CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2009. 
Zio, E. & Sansavini, G., Modeling failure cascades in critical 
infrastructures with physically-characterized components 
and interdependencies, in Reliability, Risk and Safety: Back 
to the Future – Ale, Papazoglou & Zio (eds), pp. 652 - 661, 
Proceedings of ESREL 2010 Europe Annual Conference, 5-
9 September 2010, Rhodes, Greece, Taylor & Francis 
Group, London, 2010. 
Zio, E. & Viadana, G., A thorough analysis of Differential Evo-
lution in single-objective and multi-objective optimization, 
submitted to The Seventh International Conference on“ 
Mathematical Methods in Reliability”- Theory. Methods. 
Applications, June 20-24, 2011. 
